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Introduction
The theoretical study of International politics has benefited enormously 
in the past ten years from the development of quantitative data against 
which the generalizations of international relations theory could be tested. 
It is not necessary here to summarize this important work, but merely to 
point out that the work of such investigators as Deutsch, Russett, Singer 
and Small, McClelland, Rummel and Tanter, North, Brody and Holsti, M. Haas 
and others have furnished us with quantitative measures that have helped to
★ 
challenge some of the main propositions in the field. It is to be 
anticipated that the next few years will witness the further refinement of 
such work, looking toward the development of even more politically sensitive 
indicators.
Increasingly, there has been an expression of research interest in 
scaled or categorized international events. (See among others, Azar 1970, 
Corson 1970, McClelland 1969b, and North and Choucri 1968.) In each 
case, investigators seek to establish a reliable listing of international 
outcomes, and then to scale or categorize the events in question to test 
for patterns of participation or cooperation-conflict. With the exception 
of a study by Robert North and Nazli Choucri, these efforts have largely 
been confined to the contemporary period. The data used has been derived 
from contemporary newspaper or journal sources.
★
In the course of these inquiries, propositions linking domestic 
conflict with international conflict, successful deterrence with capability 
perceptions, alliance aggregation, disaggregation and war, bipolarity and 
multipolarity and conflict have been subjected to searching examination, 
in several cases, suggesting new hypotheses.
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Newspapers as Data Sources
The first comparison of newspaper and other sources was made by
Edward Azar (Azar 1970). He found that in reporting Middle East events 
for 1955-58, The New York Times and the Middle East Journal overlapped 
only 9.7 percent of the time. Azar writes:
Given that the two sources mutually reported only 9.7% of the 
events during the entire period, we therefore, decided to determine if 
this overlap was related to event violence. Intuitively one might 
expect that the concentration of duplicated reporting would be for 
highly cooperative and/or highly conflictual events--the extreme 
values of the scale. Such events would seem to be most "newsworthy" 
and "dramatic." Our research disconfirms this notion. Instead, the 
most predominant overlap was for events classified at the intermediate 
levels of violence--communicative behaviors and domestic political 
unrest. Examining this overlap of reporting by actor, we found more 
duplicate reporting of events in the high violence region for acts 
initiated by Israel than by Egypt, while both sources reported 
more Egyptian-initiated events classified in the low violence 
(cooperative) region.
These findings on the question of source coverage serve as a 
warning against utilization of a single events data source without a 
comparison of sources by frequency as well as content. Our work has 
been directed at the whole spectrum of inter-nation behaviors regarding 
source coverage, but this research warning also is applicable to the 
study of a particular inter-nation behavior (i. e., coup occurrences, 
border conflicts, etc.). Oue may be able to use a single source for 
a particular behavior only after a systematic comparison of sources.
Tt is quite apparent from our investigation that reliance on 
a single source might generate strikingly dissimilar conclusions 
about inter-nation behavior. For example, in terms of the violence 
dimension, the New York Times Index tended to report more events 
in the intermediate categories of violence (6) in contrast to the 
Middle East Journal which reported relatively more events in the low 
violence cooperative regions (1 - 5). Since events would be the basic 
unlts-of-analysis in the quantification of inter-nation interactions, 
the cooperative-conflictual character of a nation-state might be 
greatly determined by a source.
(Azar 1970, pp. 35-36)
Diplomatic Histories as Data Sources
These cautionary remarks lead one to inquire whether additional source
materials do not need to be developed to check the findings offered on the 
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basls of newspaper data collections. One source of additional data is that 
given by the diplomatic historian. For a number of diplomatic eras, the historian 
has provided a reliable guide to the important events, those on which the 
international system turned. Against the strictly diplomatic collections 
of governments, historians have been able to balance biographical and 
monographic accounts. They have been able to evaluate critically the claims 
of statesmen in memoirs written well after the event. The diplomatic historian, 
in short, not only provides a guide to the sources, he also represents a 
critic of the sources.
In certain periods, moreover, documentary sources have been available
for some time, and diplomatic historical surveys of this material have 
reached a relatively stable plateau of scholarship. The general diplomatic 
histories for the period 1870-1890 are regarded as exemplars of the historian's 
craft. It seems unlikely at this point that new documentary or archival 
collections will be unearthed that will substantially alter our understanding 
of the period. Even in 1950 Professor W. L. Langer, writing in the Preface 
to the Second Edition of European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 was 
able to claim that the new literature since the original edition (1931) 
had not changed in any substantial way the account he would offer of these 
years. Partly because the systemic origins of World War I were deemed to 
have had their roots in the 1870-1890 period, historians have devoted a 
great deal of attention to the events of the Bismarckian system.
The importance of diplomatic history as a guide to the theoretical 
analysis of international relations is coming to be recognized among scholars. 
Recently, Frank Denton surveyed histories of war and diplomacy for the period 
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1750-1960, emphasizing the reasons historians gave for war or military 
conflicts (Denton 1969). It appears likely that historical sources will 
be plumbed more and more for events which would validate international 
relations propositions. It is therefore possible, though not certain, 
that the data offered in diplomatic histories could be used to check inter­
national theories, and perhaps to generate new ones.
The present project seeks to use the works of general diplomatic histories 
for the period, 1870-1890 (though the project will eventually be extended to 
1914) to develop a list of significant diplomatic actions. These actions 
in turn would be used as dependent variables in an attempt to validate 
or dlsconflrm existing international theoretical propositions. For the 
period 1870-1881, 987 significant events have actually been coded with 
inter-coder reliability levels substantially above 80 percent.
Presumptions in the Use of Diplomatic Historical Data
Such an attempt clearly rests upon certain presumptions about the 
nature of the historian's craft. In the first place the list of events is 
based upon the historian's culling of the significant from the insignificant 
events. It should be noted that differences of historical interpretation 
do not necessarily bias such a listing. Historians might disagree greatly 
about the interpretation of events, while agreeing generally about which 
events were significant. Their description and listing of events would be 
similar while different interpretative conclusions were drawn from the 
events recorded. It is also, of course, possible that in addition to dis­
agreements over interpretation, historians might disagree over which events 
were significant and which insignificant. Under certain circumstances one 
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could anticipate different event-lists from individual historians on the 
basis of different historical interpretations. If so, such differences 
could be checked and corrected by including the works of historians 
embracing different historical interpretations. Sectarian principles of 
inclusion could in this way be overcome.
More important than the scope of events, however, would be the 
description of individual events. In some cases historians, while surveying 
the same events, have given varying accounts of the events in question. 
This is not a chronic problem in historical research, or, to put the 
matter in relative terms, it is much less likely that historians will dis­
agree on their description of events than that they will disagree concerning the ex­
planation of those events. Still, the former does occur. If there are dis­
agreements about the description of an historical event on the basis of 
general diplomatic histories, one must proceed to the monographic or primary 
sources. Differences in descriptions of events among historians usually 
relate to partial emphases. One historian, in his description, will 
emphasize one aspect of an event, another another. More complete or 
exhaustive treatments reconcile such differences by putting the partial 
emphases into a more general and detailed context.
Perhaps a larger presumption of the study is that historical data 
for the period 1870-1890 can be relevant to International theory in the 
present epoch. If one takes the position that history is a "seamless web," 
that each event is totally unique in all of its manifestations, then the 
past offers no data relevant to the validation of generalizations which 
might be applied to the contemporary period. It is possible, however, to 
accept that each event represents a unique combination of causal factors, 
without conceding that the causes themselves are unique. Military technology, 
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for example, has changed greatly since the nineteenth century. Military 
factors, however, are statically relevant to diplomacy at all times and 
places.
Contemporary international politics witness actions which are both more 
cooperative and more conflictual than events which occurred in the nineteenth 
century. The amplitude of international politics is now greater. It is 
still interesting to note, however, which independent variable factors are 
associated with increases of conflict and which with increases in cooperation. 
Tn addition, the nature of the modern state is not so different from that 
of its late nineteenth century predecessor. Structurally, the problem of 
adjusting relationships among constituent state units should be similar 
for the period since the French Revolution, since states began to emerge 
as the instruments of nationalized publics. In structural terms, factors 
which helped to account for accommodation of interests in the nineteenth 
century should also have application today. If, for instance, concepts of 
"polarity" were relevant to patterns of conflict and cooperation in 
previous European diplomacy, they should have some application to the present 
system, though the ways in which polarity is manifested may be different 
now from what they were a hundred years ago. Though balances of power may 
now have to be measured in nuclear terms, it is likely that power equilibria 
are as important now as they were a century ago.
More fundamentally, however, in basic respects human behavior must be 
similar across historical epochs. If human nature does not change, then 
aspects of behavior also remain constant. The problem then becomes that of 
searching out elements of commonality. Commonalities can be found as long 
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as comparisons are generic rather than specific. The greater the historical 
distance between behaviors to be compared, the more generalized and aggregative 
must be the principles of comparison. The same is of course true of comparisons 
of different social and political institutions in different geographic locations 
in a given historical epoch. The more universal the political behavior one 
wants to describe and analyze the less system-specific must the terminology 
be. Thus the typical traditional political categories used in the analysis 
of Western democratic government (such as "executive, legislative and 
judicial") could not be used in the analysis of non-Western societies and 
polities. More general terminology (such as "rule-making," "interest 
articulation, interest aggregation," "political socialization" and "political 
communication and political culture") had to be employed to compare political 
systems across geographic and developmental lines.
Tuus, there is no difficulty in principle in making cross-temporal 
comparisons or in relating the behavior of the nineteenth century diplomatic 
system to the twentieth century diplomatic system. The difficulty is practical; 
on what conceptual bases to make the linkages. The generation of data 
concerning the Bismarckian system is relevant to current international 
problems and theories so long as it is couched in variables which are not system­
specific or system-restricted. In essense, therefore, the difficulties 
are not related to the relevance of the data per se, but to the analytic 
and conceptual uses made of it. The data themselves may be of great value.
None of this of course should be interpreted as arguing that studies 
of the nuclear epoch are not vitally needed, or that extrapolations from 
nineteenth or early twentieth century behavior can be straightforwardly 
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made to the present era. As additional diplomatic collections and archives 
are opened to historical inspections and as historians are able to survey 
them, their data will be added to that of the present project. In addition, 
many other scholars are focussing primarily on events since 1945 (McClelland, 
Corson, Azar, North and others); there is no paucity of work in this area, 
and the generalizations derived from it may be compared with those emanating 
from the earlier period.
Diplomatic History and Governmental Collections and Archives
Given the relevance of historical materials to international events, 
one may be tempted to ask: why survey only the diplomatic histories? 
Why not plumb the primary collections of governmental documents themselves? 
There are two reasons for not doing so. First, there is the sheer im­
possibility of surveying all the relevant sources in order to unearth each 
happening of diplomatic significance. Robert North and his associates plumbed 
more than 3,000 documents in their compilation of data for the six weeks 
period, June 28-August 4, 1914. At this level of intensity the study could 
not have been expanded to cover even the three-year period ranging from 
Agadir to the Balkan Wars to ’’orId War I. Such techniques are very useful 
in studying short crisis-periods (like Bosnia, Fashoda, or Cuba), but they 
could not possibly be used for thirty or forty-year intervals.
The second reason is that even access to all the sources in bulk 
form, assuming they could be subdivided into separate diplomatic events, does 
not solve the problem. Even if it were possible to study the entire output 
of diplomatic documents for a particular period, a mere listing would not 
distinguish the important from the unimportant events. The total diplomatic 
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record would provide, in addition to the significant acts, masses of 
irrelevant detail. rt would offer events so relatively routine or trivial 
that even the diplomatic participants themselves would not attend to them. 
Today, an American Secretary of State may specifically note and act upon
6-20 cables per day, between .1 and .3 percent of the incoming traffic 
(Rosecrance, 1968). While desk officers take account of some portion 
of the rest, most tend to fall beneath the threshold of diplomatic significance. 
Thus, the question is posed again: how to screen the important from the 
relatively unimportant events? Who should be our guide to such a task?
Once more, the diplomatic historian is seen as an Indispensable filter.
On the basis of his expert knowledge, he is able to distinguish between 
significant and unimportant happenings. Presumably, those acts and events 
which diplomatic historians have seen fit to record in their works are those 
that the most highly trained and knowledgeable scholars regard as most 
Important and most relevant to an understanding of the period.
Data-Making Procedures in the Situational Analysis Project
The Situational Analysis Project, at this time, has completed five
phases of data-making and analysis:
I. Selection of Historical Sources
IT. Compilation of Events from Each Source
TH. Compilation of a Master List of Events
TV. Creation of a Cooperation-Conflict Scale
V. Scaling of Specific Events
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Certain primitive terms will be defined prior to discussion of these
phases.
An event is:
Any overt input and/or output of the type 'who does or says what 
to and/or with whom and when' which is communicated and which 
has ramifications for the behavior of an international actor 
or actors.
For coding purposes, an event must be recorded in one of the 
sources which meets the coding rules.
Interpretation:
This definition is slightly different from the one used by 
McClelland and Azar. McClelland would exclude "constant and 
routine exchange of goods and services and of concerns 
and interests between nations which tend to bring them together 
in a condition of interdependence" (such as transactions flows) 
from his list of event/interactions. Both Azar's and the 
current project would recognize that changes in transactions 
could well become diplomatically important. In short, the 
rule is to record the transaction when a source mentions it.
The definition of event is different from that proposed by 
Azar in that it requires communication of the action in question 
to some other state. Consider the following case: in 1878 
the British Cabinet took a secret decision to move Indian 
troops to Malta in the Russo-Turkish crisis. Until those 
troops were actually in process of being moved or the move­
ment was announced publicly, the event would not be coded. 
Nations, in short, must not be talking to themselves.
An event only becomes international when it is communicated 
to some other actor or when overt action takes place.
a. Perceptions v. Actions
For the same reason, perceptions of statesmen or governments 
which are entirely confined to national decision-making arenas 
and are not communicated are not coded.
b. Actions Require Performance by Officials
Events or actions are performed only by official representatives 
of a political entity. Anti-foreign riots would not be coded. 
Actions by members of an opposition party would not be coded. 
Changes of government, even though involving official actions, 
would not be coded unless the source consulted mentioned the 
possible international impact of the change.
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c. Discontinuous v. Continuous Events
Events must be discontinuous and capable of being given a 
date. Continuous events like wars, on-going negotiations, 
etc., are coded only when their inception and conclusion 
are mentioned or when special changes or departures take 
place in the on-going process. The general rule is to note 
such departures only when the source in question mentions 
them.
d. Geographic Ambit
Since the focus of the international system, 1870-90 was 
on Europe, it was decided to restrict diplomatic/interaction 
events for this period to those in which at least one European 
state was a participant as either actor or target. For 
later periods, this coding rule will be modified as a more 
global system develops.
International actors are either sovereign states or political movements which 
have attained some degree of international recognition (such as that 
accorded the Bosnia insurgents after their revolts against Turkish rule 
in 1875). A sovereign state is a "clearly defined territory and an associated 
self-identified social and political system characterized by a governmental 
structure whose authority is externally recognized" (Alker and Bock 1968).
An initiator of an event is an actor who is responsible for originating 
an international event. A target is an actor who is the object of an 
event, to whom something is said or done. There are two kinds of targets:
a. a direct target is a target which is explicitly mentioned in the account 
of the event in the original source; b. an indirect target is a target which 
is implicit in the account of the event. Take for example the following 
account of an event--"Germany tells Austria that she opposes France." In 
this event Germany is the initiator and Austria is the direct target.
The indirect target is France. A dyad is a pair of actors and a directed dyad 
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is an ordered pair of actors in the form (initiator, target). Cooperation­
conflict is a concept or dimension, whose extremes are cooperation and conflict, 
which can be used to describe the consequences of an event from the relations 
between a specific directed dyad. Therefore, since an event may involve 
one or more directed dyads, an event consists of a set of directed dyadic 
interactions (or simply interactions). An international system is simply 
a set of international actors and a set of cooperation-conflict levels for 
each directed dyad. The Situational Analysis Project has been restricted 
for the period, 1870-90 to the international system in which at least one 
of the actors in each directed dyad is a European power.
I. Selection of Historical Sources
The sources used for the coding of data, 1870-1881 were:
Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, v. 1 (London, 1952) 
Fay, Sidney B., The Origins of the World War, v. 1 (New York, 1930) 
Hinsley, F. H. (Ed.), Material Progress and World-Wide Problems:
1870-1898, v. 11, The New Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge , 1962) 
Langer, W. L. (Ed.), An Encyclopedia of World History (New York, 1952) 
Langer, W. L., European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890
(New York, 1950)
Schmitt, B., Triple Alliance and Triple Entente (New York, 1934) 
Sontag, R., European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932 (New York, 1933) 
Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918
(Oxford, 1954)
The primarv rule for selection of sources is that they fe)} on the Aiueri.c«u 
HiscoricaL Association's Guide to Historical Literature for the period in 
question and that they cover at least a twelve-year period of international 
* 
Contrast this definition with that given in Alker and Bock 1968, p. 106.
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diplomacy. The specification of a twelve-year rule prevents inclusion of 
essentially monographic treatments of very short time periods. It also 
rules out accounts that deal solely with a functional area of interest 
(such as colonial or naval policy). The reason for making certain that 
general treatments and surveys will form the basis for the event-list 
is that reliance upon monographic treatments would alter criteria of 
significance. The general treatments aim at a roughly common level of 
abstraction, and therefore at a roughly similar standard of significance. 
To have included monographic accounts of the Near Eastern Crisis (1875-78) 
or the negotiation of the Dual Alliance (1878-79) would have skewed the list 
toward two specific episodes; it would not have provided relatively "even" 
coverage of the entire period. Moreover, since detailed treatments do not 
exist for each microscopic time period in the mongraphic literature, there 
is no way in which an evenness of abstraction and significance could have 
been attained had the monographic accounts been included in the compilation 
of the event-list.
There were other sources on the A. H. A. list which met the coding rules 
and which also could have been plumbed for events. These include works by 
Hauser, Mansergh, Schmitt, Roubaud, Meyer, Renouvin and Hayes. In a second 
stage investigation these works will be covered by our coding procedure. 
However, even using the eight sources which were noted in the first stage 
of the project, we found that each additional source added fewer and fewer 
events to our master list. The marginal utility of coding additional sources 
is already very small. Nonetheless, to make sure that no events of significance 
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are omitted, the second stage of the project will proceed to cover the 
additional works and any others that subsequently appear and that fall 
within our coding categories.
IT. Compilation of Events from Each Source
The principal investigator along with two graduate students of history, 
two graduate students of political science and an undergraduate student of 
political science, systematically selected events for the period 1870-1881 
from each historical source. Each coder was given instructions specifying 
what an event is and how to record it (see above). Coders were instructed 
to list the date of the event, the nature of the event (in language as 
close as possible to the original wording of the historian), the initiator 
and the target of the event on 3"x5" index cards along with the page and 
paragraph of the source in which the event was found. If the exact date 
of the event was missing, the event was still recorded--but events without 
relatively specific descriptions or without specific initiators or targets 
were not recorded.
An initial check on the reliability of event selection was made. 
Several coders selected events from the same passage of several sources. 
The average overlap of events recorded was in the vicinity of 857„--that is, 
less than 157, of the events listed by any given coder were not listed by 
other coders. This seemed to be an acceptable level of reliability for 
the initial stages of event selection; and reliability improved in later 
stages. After the initial cross-coder reliability check was completed, each 
coder went on to code all the events for the required period in only one or 
two of the historical sources. Events were coded in the order in which they 
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appeared in the text. Coders were instructed to arrange the index cards 
in rough chronological order prior to the third phase of data-making.
TIT. Compilation of a Master List of Events
Events were recorded on index cards for all the 
historical sources. At this point, a committee was formed consisting of 
all the coders. The committee reviewed the selected events in chronological 
order in order to decide which events could be placed on a master list and 
to establish correspondences between events mentioned by different historians. 
The criteria for forming the master list were as follows:
a. If only one historian mentioned a given event, the event was 
included in the master list.
b. Tf more than one historian mentioned a given event and one 
historian's version was clearly more specific, detailed and 
accurate than the others', that historian's version was included 
in the master list.
c. If more than one historian mentioned a given event and the 
content of the different versions was not contradictory, a 
composite event including all the information contained in 
different versions was included in the master list.
d. If none of the versions of the event contained a specific 
date or if different versions were contradictory, outside 
sources were consulted.
The number of events selected for the master list was 987. The compilation 
of the master list resulted in a higher level of reliability of event selection 
for each individual source since committee members frequently had to check 
the source to determine whether a given event was comparable to an event in 
another source. The procedure was rather time-consuming, but worthwhile 
in the long-run. It is quite possible that a single person could be instructed 
to compile master lists reliably, and this will undoubtedly be attempted in 
data-making for other historical periods.
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Two versions of the master list were recorded.
written copy with the date of the event, the content 
page and paragraph of each source in which the event
The first was a hand-
of the event and the
was mentioned. This
and/or bias of individualversion will be used in later analyses of the overlap
historians. The second version was a deck of IBM computer cards with the 
date and content of the event. IBM cards were used because of their flexibility-- 
later information on dates or on additional events may be added (and cards 
rearranged) without difficulty. Copies of the master list can be made in­
expensively on IBM card-printing machines.
IV. Creation of a Cooperation-Conflict Scale
The next phase of data-making was the creation of a scale for measuring
the amount of cooperation-conflict in each directed dyadic interaction.
The firBt step was to devise a relatively exhaustive typology of events.
A typology with 42 categories of directed dyadic interactions was developed
* 
by synthesizing and generalizing three previously developed typologies 
and by adding or revising categories when old categories did not work 
(see Figure 1). This was done by the committee which compiled the master list. 
The typology was checked for exhaustiveness, generality and reliability by 
applying it to Langer's Encyclopedia of World History for a variety of 
historical periods. No formal statistical checks were made at this time, 
but the experience of the committee was that it was sufficiently exhaustive, 
general and reliable.
The three typologies were McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey (7EIS) 
typology, Corson's modified version of the WEIS typology and the categories used 
by Moses, Brody, Holsti, Kadane and Milstein in their Q-sort scaling technique. 
See Corson 1970 and Moses et al. 1967.
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Figure 1. The Event Typology
1. Inquiry for Information from X--Favorable
2. Warning to X--Military
4. Start of Negotiations between A and X
6. Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons (nucs) against X
10. Trade Ban
11. Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons against X
13. Comment Unfavorably on Statement of X
15. withdraw from Military Alliance which was Directed against X
22. Withdraw Proposal toward X--Proposal was Unfavorable
23. Acceptance of Proposal by X--Diplomatic
24. Pledge to Improve Relations with X
34. Rejection/Refusa1 of Proposal made by X--Military
35. Withdrawal from Military Alliance with X
38. Declaration of War on X
39. Arms Control Agreement with X
40. Request Positive toward X
45. Military Occupation of X
48. Informal Agreement with X--Diplomatic
49. Increase Trade with X
50. Blockade/Siege of X
51. Statement of Policy Unfavorable to X
52. General Observation that Relations with X are Deteriorating
53. Arms Reduction or Reduction of Military Budget--Previously thought
to be Directed against X
55. Warning to X--Diplomatic
62. End Major Attack on X
64. Full Mobilization against X
65. Ultimatum to X
67. End Economic Sanction against X
70. Sign Military Alliance with other Power against X
71. Major Attack on/lnvasion of X
80. Severance of Diplomatic Relations with X
82. Internal Change in A--Unfavorable to X
83. Internal Action Favorable to X
86. Breach of Arms Control Agreement with X
87. Assurance to X--Military
88. End Military Aid to X
90. End Informal Agreement with X--Diplomatic
94. Agreement with X--Formal Diplomatic
99. Military Alliance with X
100. Establish Economic Community with X
101. Supply Military Aid to X
102. Establish Political Federation with X
CL
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The next step was an attempt to rank order the categories with respect 
to the degree of cooperation-conflict. Three graduate students at the 
University of California and three professors at Cornell ranked the full 
list of types in Figure 1. The level of agreement on these rankings 
was quite high--rank order correlations were all above ,85--but it was 
decided that several categories were very ambiguous, several were too similar 
with respect to cooperation-conflict to be distinguishable, and that a higher 
level of measurement would be both possible and desirable. Therefore, the 
number of categories was reduced to 32 by eliminating or replacing the 
ambiguous ones and by collapsing the nearly equivalent ones (see Figure 2); 
and a technique for obtaining a ratio or interval scale was devised.
The technique adopted was an adaptation of the procedure used for 
obtaining ratio scales in psychophysics. Eight scalers, all experts on 
international politics, were selected. Each scaler was given the following 
verbal instructions:
You will be presented with a series of interaction categories 
in irregular order. Your task is to tell how cooperative they 
seem by assigning numbers to them. Call the first category 
any number that seems to you appropriate. Then assign successive 
numbers in such a way that they reflect your subjective impression. 
For example if a category seems twenty times as cooperative as 
another, assign a number twenty times as large as the first. 
If it seems one-fifth as cooperative assign a number one-fifth 
as large, and so forth. Use fractions, whole numbers, or decimals 
but make each assignment proportional to the intensity of coopera­
tion as you perceive it. Consider the number 1 to be the lowest 
possible number (corresponding to minimal cooperation) and the 
number 100 to be the highest possible number. The number 50 
should be used for those categories which seem to you to be neither 
cooperative nor uncooperative.
★
A
and ratio
full explanation of the differences between rank-order, 
scales appears in Torgerson 1958, p. 16.
internal
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Figure 2. Reduced Typology in Rank Order
(According to the Average Rankings of the Six Individuals)
most
cooperative 32. Establish Political Federation with X
a 31. Establish Economic Community with X
30. Military Alliance with X
29. Supply Military Aid to X
28. Arms Control Agreement with X
27. Agreement with X--Formal Diplomatic
26. Assurance to X--Military
25. Informal Agreement with X--Diplomatic
24. Acceptance of Proposal by X--Diplomatic
23. Increase Trade with X
22. Arms Reduction or Reduction of Military Budget Previously 
Thought to be Directed against X
21. Pledge to Improve Relations with X
20. Request Positive Toward X
19. Start of Negotiations between A and X
18. Inquiry for Information from X--Favorable
17. Comment Unfavorable on Statement of X
16. General Observation that Relations with X are Deteriorating
15. Statement of Policy Unfavorable to X
14. Rejection/Refusal of Proposal made by X--Military
13. Withdrawal from Military Alliance with X
12. Warning to X--Diplomatic
11. Trade Ban
10. Sign Military Alliance with Other Power against X
9. Warning to X--Military
8. Ultimatum to X
7. Full Mobilization against X
6. Declaration of War on X
5. Blockade/Siege of X
4. Major Attack on/lnvasion of X
3. Military Occupation of X
* 2. Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons against X
least 1. Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons against X
cooperative
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Prior to scaling interaction categories, scalers were given a practice 
session in which they used the instructions to judge the lengths of 
straight line segments. Usually one practice session was needed to 
Introduce the concept of proportionality. After the practice session, 
the scalers were presented with the 32 categories of interactions listed 
in Figure 2 in a random order on a sheet of paper like that illustrated in 
Figure 3.
With this technique, scale scores of high interscaler reliability 
were obtained (see Table 1). No interscaler correlation was lower than 
.927- The high product-moment correlations suggest that an interval scale 
was obtained. Tt would be incorrect, however, to claim that a ratio scale 
was obtained since the way in which the Stevens technique was adapted for 
use here--e. g., the addition of maximal and minimal scores and a midpoint— 
violates some of the requirements for a true ratio scale. Final scale 
scores were obtained by computing the geometric mean of the eight scalers' 
scores for each category (Stevens suggests the use of the geometric mean 
rather than the arithmetic mean). The final result is illustrated in Figure 4 
and will henceforth be called the "Corkeley Scale" to commemorate the 
collaboration of Cornell and Berkeley in its formation.
At this point, a scholar trained in diplomatic history went through 
t he entire master list of events and identified all the directed dyadic 
interactions in each event. This was considered to be more desirable than 
to ask each coder to individually identify interactions since the possibility 
of disagreement on indirect targets was great.
This technique was adapted from that suggested in Stevens 1966 for 
obtaining ratio scales.
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Figure 3. Scaling Form Used for Obtaining a Modified "Ratio Scale"
Scale Geometric
Score.Hean
Agreement with X--Formal Diplomatic
Pledge to Improve Relations with X
Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons against X
Withdrawal from Military Alliance with X
Ultimatum to X
Establish Political Federation with X
Blockade/Siege of X
Assurance to X--Military
Arms Reduction or Reduction of Military Budget 
Previously Thought to be Directed against X
Request Positive toward X
Inquiry for Information from X Favorable
Military Occupation of X
General Observation that Relations with X 
are Deteriorating
Warning to X--Diplomatic
Full Mobilization against X
Establish Economic Conmunity with X
Military Alliance with X
Arms Control Agreement with X
Increase Trade with X
Start Negotiations between A and X
Informal Agreement with X--Diplomatic
Comment Unfavorably on Statement of X
Rejection/Refusal of Proposal Made by X--Milltary
Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons Against X
Declaration of War on X
Major Attack on/Tnvasion of X
Supply Military Aid to X
Acceptance of Proposal by X--Diplomatic
Trade Ban
Warning to X--Mllitary
Statement of Policy Unfavorable to X
Sign Military Alliance with other Power against X
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Figure 4. The Corkeley Scale
Category Scale Score
Unlimited Use of Nuclear Weapons 1.01
Limited Use of Nuclear Weapons 3.27
Military Occupation 4.51
Major Attack on/lnvasion of 7.99
Blockade/Siege 10.6
Declaration of War 11.7
Full Mobilization against X 16.0
Ultimatum to X 16.3
Sign Military Alliance with Other Power against X 24.7
Warning to X--Military 25.2
Trade Ban 27.6
Withdrawal from Military Alliance with X 28.6
Warning to X--Diplomatic 32.5
Rejection/Refusal of Proposal Made by X--Military 34.9
Statement of Policy Unfavorable to X 42.1
General Observation that Relations with X are
Deteriorating 44.5
Comment Unfavorably on Statement of X 45.8
Inquiry for Information from X--Favorable 52.0
Request Positive toward X 54.0
Pledge to Improve Relations with X 58.2
Start Negotiations between A and X 60.3
Acceptance of Proposal by X--Diplomatic 64.8
Arms Reduction or Reduction of Military Budget
Previously Thought to be Directed against X 65.5
Increase Trade with X 65.8
Informal Agreement with X--Diplomatic 69.1
Assurance to X--Military 73.7
Agreement with X--Formal Diplomatic 76.3
Supply Military Aid to X 81.2
Arms Control Agreement with X 82.9
Military Alliance with X 88.0
Establish Economic Community with X 94.0
Establish Political Federation with X 99.6
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V. Scaling of Specific Events
Coders were instructed to assign cooperation-conflict scores to 
specific interactions using the Corkeley Scale. They were told to find 
a category in the Corkeley Scale which most closely approximated the nature 
of the interaction in question. If they thought that the interaction 
was either more or less cooperative than the Corkeley Scale score 
suggested, they could assign the interaction a score anywhere within the 
limits created by the next highest and the next lowest category in the 
Corkeley Scale.
Two kinds of reliability tests were made of the Corkeley coding 
of interactions; the first was a simple intercoder reliability test and 
the second was a test of the stability of each coder's application of 
the Corkeley Scale over time. Intercoder reliabilities for the first 
262 interactions in the master list were checked as well as the reliabilities 
of three subsets of these interactions. The results of this test are given 
in Tables 2 through 5. By the standards of previous cooperation-conflict 
studies (see Moses, et al. 1967), very high levels of intercoder agreement 
were obtained. There appears to be a slight decrease in agreement in the 
second hundred and final 62 interactions--a reversal of the finding by the 
Stanford group that reliability improved over time. But this may be 
attributed to the greater familiarity of the coders with the first hundered 
interactions since the first hundred were used in training sessions. The 
stability of scoring was tested by having the group of coders code the 
same hundred interactions at two different times. An interval of two weeks 
between codings assured that short-term memory effects would be minimal. 
The results of the stability test are given in Table 6.
-25-
Table 2. Intercoder Reliability for the Corkeley Scaling of Interactions: 
Correlations between Coders for 262 Interactions
BS CC AA BG AS RG GM
BS -- 88 87 88 87 87 94
CC 92 -- 88 89 89 89 95
AA 91 92 -- 91 90 90 95
BG 91 93 94 -- 88 91 95
AS 91 92 92 92 -- 87 94
RG 90 93 94 93 90 -- 95
*
GM 96 97 97 97 96 96 --
Key: Correlations are given without decimals. ("92" means that 
the correlation was .92.) Spearman correlation coefficients 
are given in the upper-right portion of the matrix, Pearson 
correlations are given in the lower-left.
★
GM stands for geometric mean.
BS, CC, AA, BG, AS, RG are the initials of the Cornell 
students who coded interactions.
Table 3. Intercoder Reliability for Corkeley Scaling:
The First 100 Interactions (Nos. 1-100)
BS CC AA BG AS RG GM
BS -- 91 90 90 90 90 93
CC 95 -- 94 94 93 94 97
AA 95 97 -- 94 94 94 98
BG 95 97 97 -- 93 93 97
AS 94 97 97 96 — 93 97
RG 93 96 96 95 95 •• 97
GM 97 99 99 99 98 98 --
Key: See Key for Table 2
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Table 4. Intercoder Reliability for Corkeley Coding:
The Second Hundred Interactions (Nos. 101-200)
BS CC AA BG AS RG GM
BS -- 89 88 86 89 83 95
CC 91 -- 88 87 88 87 95
AA 90 91 -- 91 88 88 95
BG 87 90 93 — 85 90 93
AS 89 90 87 84 -- 83 94
RG 88 91 93 94 84 -- 93
GM 95 97 97 95 93 96 —
Key: See Key for Table 2
Table 5. Intercoder Reliability for Corkeley Coding:
The Last Sixty-Two Interactions (Nos. 201-262)
BS CC AA BG AS RG GM
BS — 84 80 88 81 86 93
CC 89 -- 77 88 81 82 90
AA 82 79 -- 82 83 85 90
BG 88 85 86 -- 83 87 93
AS 84 83 83 88 — 82 91
RG 87 85 89 89 84 -- 93
GM 93 93 92 95 92 95 —
Key: See Key for Table 2
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Table 6. Stability of Coding over Time
Coder Correlations between Different Codings
Pearson Spearman
BS 88 88
CC 84 88
AA 86 83
BG 96 95
AS 90 91
RG 94 92
GM 94 93
All the correlations are above .83. Thus, the Corkeley scaling technique
provides a way of obtaining reliable, interval-level measurement of the 
degree of cooperation-conflict in directed dyadic interactions.
It is necessary to note that coding was always done in chronological 
order. This was done so that the context of events and interactions would 
be clear to coders. It would be possible and desirable to see if similar 
scores could be obtained if the order of events was randomized before coding. 
Judging from the reactions of coders, however, this does not appear to be 
too likely. Thus, the context may be very Important for the judgment 
of cooperation-conflict levels.
After the initial reliability testing, coders were given, on the average, 
one hundred interactions per week to code. At the end of the week, meetings 
were held for the purpose of discussing the historical context and checking 
for general procedural snags, typographical errors and the like. The entire 
1870-1881 period was coded in this manner (see the coding example in Figure 5).
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Figure 5. An Example of SAP Cooperation-Conflict Coding
(FM=Foreign Minister; AMB=Ambassador; EMP=Emperor; CHANC=Chancellor)
September 6, 1872
06091872 002
RUSSIAN FM EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER AUSTRIAN INTRIGUES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.
Initiator Target Type of Target Cooperation-Conflict Score
Russia Austria Direct 45.79
September 6, 1872
06091872 003
AUSTRIAN FM TELLS RUSSIAN FM THAT 1) AUSTRIAN POLICIES IN BOS-HERZ ARE 
DEFENSIVE, 2) AUSTRIA WISHES GOOD RELATIONS WITH SERBIA, 3) AUSTRIA
WILL NOT ALLOW EXTENSION OF SERBIAN TERRITORY, AND 4) AUSTRIA DESIRES 
STATUS QUO IN TURKEY.
Initiator Target Type of Target Cooperat ion-Conflict Score
Austria Russia Direct 48.72
Austria Serbia Indirect 44.04
Austria Turkey Indirect 55.28
September 6, 1872
06091872 004
RUSSIAN FM TELLS AUSTRIAN FM THAT RUSSIA IS NOT CONNECTED WITH SERBIAN
AGITATION AND THAT RUSSIA IS SATISFIED WITH THE STATUS QUO IN THE NEAR EAST.
Initiator Target Type of Target Cooperation-Conflict Score
Russia Austria Direct 57.03
Russia Serbia Indirect 45.12
Russia Turkey Indirect 56.55
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Figure 5. An Example of SAP Cooperation-Conflict Coding 
(continued)
September 6, 1872
06091872 005
AUSTRIAN AND RUSSIAN FMS AGREE TO POLICY OF NONINTERVENTION IN THE NEAR EAST 
AND TO FOLLOW POLICY OF STATUS QUO.
Initiator
Austria
Russia
Target
Russia
Austria
Type of Target
Direct
Direct
Cooperation-Conflict Score
71.22
71.22
September 6, 1872
06091872 006
RUSSIAN FM IN PRESENCE OF FRENCH AMB AND GERMAN EMP MENTIONS AGREEMENT WITH 
GERMAN CHANC AT THREE EMPERORS CONFERENCE.
Initiator
Russia
Russia
Target
France
Germany
Type of Target 
Direct 
Direct
Cooperation-Conflict Score
45.26
55.23
A new set of data cards was punched containing the following information: 
the identification number of the event in question, the date of the event, 
the identification number of the interaction, code numbers for the initiator 
aid the target, the cooperation-conflict score (the geometric mean of all the 
coders' scores), and whether the target was direct or indirect. These data 
cards are being used in Phase VI of the Situational Analysis Project, 
Preliminary Data Analysis. They allow for a high degree of flexibility in the 
analysis of the cooperation-conflict data in the following respects:
a. Analysts may choose the time periods they wish to investigate 
simply by aggregating scores over time; they are not limited to 
calendar or fiscal years or even to months but only by days and 
by the requirements of their analysis.
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b. Analysts may choose among the following units of analysis-- 
directed dyads, dyads, actors, subsets of actors or systems.
c. Analysts may choose between synchronic (or cross-sectional) 
and diachronic (or time-series) analysis--or they may combine 
both approaches.
d. Analysts may control for the possibility of bias introduced
by the identification of indirect targets or the disaggregation 
of events into interactions.
Methodological Justification and Research Relevance
I. Monadic, Dyadic and Directed Dyadic Events
The event is used in the above data-making procedures because it
enables the researcher to use and compare a variety of historical sources in
a systemic fashion. (Moses et al. 1967, Holstl et al. 1968, Corson 1970, McClelland 
1969 a and b, Azar 1970) The directed dyad is less frequently used, however, 
as the unit of analysis. Thus, some justification for this choice of basic 
unit--besides the added flexibility it allows the analyst--must be given.
Other studies of cooperation-conflict have used a variety of different 
units--the dyad (Klingberg 1961), the monad (Tanter 1966), the pole or alliance 
subset (Corson 1970; Singer and Small 1965), and the system (Denton 1969). 
The assumptions involved in using these units of analysis are not fully appropriate 
for the study of international politics in the 1870s for several reasons.
First, the use of the dyad presumes a high degree of dyadic symmetry. It is 
assumed that if nation A is cooperating with nation B, then nation B is cooperating 
with nation A. There, therefore, can be no asymmetrical relationships. Some 
of our data analysis has convinced us however that they are not fully symmetrical 
for the period, 1870-1881 (Hart 1972). Second, the use of the monad involves 
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an assumption that there is such a thing as "generalized conflict-cooperation" 
independent of target--that is, that there are some actors who are uniformly 
cooperative or uncooperative with all or most other actors and it thus makes 
sense to look at the attributes of actors which are "aggressive" or "pacific" 
to see what causes this phenomenon. One should use monadic events, therefore, 
only when it appears that actors are not discriminating in direction their 
cooperation or conflict toward other actors. This is clearly not the case 
in the Europe of the 1870s. In this period nations definitely did discriminate 
in their behavior toward others: what was conflict toward one power was often 
ipso facto cooperation toward another. Thirdly, the use of the "pole" or 
alliance as a unit of analysis assumes unanimity on the part of "pole" members. 
That is, if nation C and nation D are aligned against E and F, it is assumed 
that nations C and D are successfully coordinating their policies toward E 
and F--that no difference exists between them. Certainly in the 1870s this 
is an incorrect assumption.
Finally, the use of the "system" as the unit of analysis is always 
appropriate where time-series analysis is possible--even though there may be 
problems involved in devising indices for systemic cooperation-conflict. Never­
theless, if measurement begins at the level of the system, no information about 
the contribution of Individual actors, dyads or directed dyads can be obtained 
without going back to the original data sources--a key restriction.
Thus, the use of the directed dyad--which expresses cooperation or conflict 
going in one direction--allows one to test for more detailed and sensitive rela- 
tionships--for symmetry for example. Further, the directed dyad can be aggregated 
while it is not possible to disaggregate the dyad or the monad. Hence all the
advantages of dyadic, monadic, pole-oriented or systemic analysis can be obtained 
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without their ensuing complications. There is, of course, a price to pay for 
fewer assumptions and greater generality; and that is a slightly more intricate 
data format that requires more sophisticated mathematic and statistical 
techniques than those necessitated by the other units of analysis.
II. Discontinuous v. Continuous Events
Some justification must also be given for the decision to use only 
discontinuous events rather than using both continuous and discontinuous events 
as some studies have done (Corson 1970). Continuous events, such as wars, 
negotiations, and trade bans do have an effect on international actors; but 
it is unclear whether their effect is really continuous. That is, even though 
a war may be going on and the fact that a war is going on influences the cooperation­
conflict behavior of some actors, it seems reasonable to assume that the greatest 
effect of the war is felt at its inception and its end, or at major turning 
points. The alternatives to this assumption are extremely problematical.
One can assume, for example, that continuous events have an effect on the actors 
involved which is described by some function of the time they last—e. g., 
the effect of a war intensifies as time goes on. But there is no cbvious way 
t o assign such functions, a priori. Corson, for example, assumes that continuous 
events have constant effe cts on the cooperation-conflict levels of the actors 
involved. Certainly, this assumption is occasionally true for events of short, 
intense duration. It might be true for a mobilization of missile launching 
equipment in the Cuban missile crisis, but would not be true for a long drawn- 
out trade ban.
In addition, the use of continuous events presents conceptual difficulties.
Does a technological innovation qualify as a continuous event? Must a continuous 
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event be communicated like a discontinuous event? Do continuous events have 
initiators and targets? Finally, while the Situational Analysis Project study 
does not use continuous events, it would be possible to include the effects of 
continuous events like wars or negotiations to see what the impact would be on 
the pattern of dyadic interaction. It would be possible to add conflict or 
cooperation scores to the entire range of dyadic events between the inception 
and termination of a continuous event. Thus the benefits of both a 
continuous and noncontinuous procedure could be obtained.
For most continuous events, however, the present procedure is likely to 
be most satisfactory. Our coding rules require that we mention a continuous 
event again when any change in its course is recorded by the historian. In 
short, we take account of the event when anything occurs that appears historically 
significant. If a crisis is very intense, historians will refer to its on-going 
course again and again and measure each minor development. If any major 
battles are fought, they will be listed separately. Thus the intensity of the 
crisis is likely to be mirrored in the intensity of coverage by the historian. 
Relying upon his judgment to distinguish the significant from the insignificant, 
should help assuage the problem of treating only discontinuous events in our 
master list.
III. Disaggregation and Targeting
The 987 events coded from historical sources for the period 1870-1881 
have been subdivided into 2,046 separate interactions. Thus, it was 
hypothesized that each event should not be looked at in terms of its general 
effect upon the rest of the international system ( monadically) but rather in 
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terms of its effects on specific actors. When states engage in actions, they 
usually have specific targets in mind. In some cases, there is an indirect 
as well as a direct target. For example, in 1870 on the eve of the Franco- 
Prussian War, Prince Bismarck asked Russian help against Austro-Hungary in the 
event that Austria supported France. Russia, however, refused to give such support. 
In this instance, the direct target of the Russian refusal is Prussia, but the 
indirect targets are Austria and France. While Russian action harms the direct 
target, Prussia, it helps the indirect targets Austria and France.
In theory, of course, the number of indirect targets is indefinite, 
and scalers cannot be expected to know which nations to include and which to 
exclude as indirect targets. The solution adopted was to ask a scholar trained 
in diplomatic history of the period to specify which targets should be scaled 
in each case. Since the distinction between direct and indirect targets has 
been maintained on the data cards, however, it is possible to exclude the 
indirect targets for purposes of data manipulation.
There are some cases, of course, when multiple interactions occur. When 
Austria-Hungary and the other powers formulated demands upon Turkey in 1875-76, 
some actions were taken collectively which could also be accurately represented 
as individual dyadic interactions. We have disaggregated them accordingly. 
On the other hand, if multiple interactions are sanctioned, average scale 
scores will be weighted in terms of multiple interaction events. Frequencies 
of individual action will also be distorted by the inclusion of large numbers 
of such events. Azar discusses this problem, also (Azar 1970, p. 17). In the 
period 1870-1890, this does not appear to present a special problem because 
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multiple interactions are not frequent nor are they apparently biased in one 
direction. Multilateral interactions take place in cooperation as well as 
conflict.
TV. Historical and Newspaper Sources
There is no question that historical and newspaper sources
capture different accounts of a specific time period. As we have noted, 
Azar'8 comparison of New York Times and Middle East Journal listings of 
events for 1955-58 in the Middle East displayed an overlap of only 9.7 
percent. In order to test differences and similarities between newspaper 
and historical treatments in the 19th century, we compared our historical 
source master list for the period January to June, 1875 with the accounts 
of the contemporary London Times. In this instance there was only a 3.3 percent 
overlap.
Figure 6. Overlap of Events in Newspaper and Historical Sources
London Times Diplomatic Historical
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Further, there appeared to be some systematic differences in the recording 
of events in the two sources. The Times included many more cooperative 
events than noncooperative ones. The diplomatic histories manifested no trend 
in this direction.
CONFLICT <-----------------t-------------------^COOPERATION
Table 7. Dyad Frequencies by Scale Values of Cooperation-Conflict for Source
7„ of dyads 
which fall between 
scale scores 
21-40
7» of dyads 
which fall between 
scale scores 
41-60
7, of dyads 
which fall between 
scale scores 
61-80
Total
Dyads
London 
Times 
Data
N = 63
% = 7.7
N = 599
7» = 73.5
N = 153
7O = 18.8 815
Historical 
Source 
Data
N = 18 
% = 11.6
N = 119
7o = 76.8
N = 18
7o = 11.6 155
An inspection of the data reveals that the Times missed some events of great 
diplomatic significance. In fact, the distorting influence of the "war scare" 
between Germany and France which was the highlight of the diplomatic treatments 
was not captured on ’ a systemic basis in the Times accounts. Perhaps surprisingly, 
however, the scale scores for newspaper events between France and Germarytaken 
singly followed a path not unlike though lagged behind the scale scores for the 
historical data events between the two powers. The Times certainly noted the 
tension between France and Germany, though it did not seize upon the gravity 
of the crisis either systemically or bilaterally.
There were other important differences. Historical accounts were also 
focussed largly on the actions of the great powers, performing 91.6 percent of 
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all initiations and serving as target of 87.8 percent of the actions (Gray 1971).
Thus, very great differences in the frequency of action for individual 
powers is found between the Times and the historical sources. This, of course, 
is not surprising. Much of what the Times regards as "news" does not pass the 
historian's filter of diplomatic significance. Again similarly, the actions of 
many of the smaller powers are devalued in the historical accounts as less 
important for the international system.
As we have seen, the Times record is biased in a cooperative direction 
relative to the historical accounts. This is also perhaps not surprising.
The war scare was not fully understood nor its gravity fully recognized in contemporary 
accounts. The conflict largely took place at the diplomatic and hence covert 
level. If the tension had been more open, it is possible that newspaper sources 
might have recorded about the same levels of cooperation as those found later 
in the historical treatments. To observe whether this is so, other periods 
of greater overt conflict should be surveyed to note similarities and differences 
among newspaper and historical accounts. A viable hypothesis, however, is that 
newspapers may miss the types of conflict and cooperation which, while significant, 
are not overt. When secret alliances are signed, they may miss some of the 
important cooperation taking place. When covert diplomatic crises occur, 
newspapers may underestimate the seriousness of the conflict. The latter seems 
to have been the case in the period January to June, 1875.
It is difficult to reach an unequivocal conclusion on newspaper sources.
They include many interactions that historians with the benefit of hindsight 
and full access to the sources will regard as trivial. They probably slight those 
activities of governments which can be concealed, or whose real gravity can 
be masked. This does not mean that they are not an indispensable source. In 
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a second stage of the Situational Analysis Project, we hope to survey newspaper
data for the period, 1870-1880 and to compare scalings and patternings
with those of the historical accounts.
V. Revision of the Corkeley Scale?
There is another question related to the issue of historical generality.
How generally applicable is the Corkeley scale? First it is necessary to say
that efforts were made to assure that the categories used in the scale would
not be historically specific (by testing them with events from other periods
taken from Langer's Encyclopedia of World History). Some categories like those
for nuclear attacks were included so that the categories could be applied
to the contemporary era. But since the scale scores were assigned by experts
of international relations of the nineteenth century 
century experts were also used), and since the main 
(although some twentieth
concern was for a scale
which would be valid for the period, 1870-1890, it is possible to question the 
historical generality of the scale. For example, is an ultimatum more 
conflictual in the contemporary era than a declaration of war (see Figure 4)? 
Stated in more familiar terms, the question is whether the diplomatic "rules 
of the game" have changed since 1890. Another aspect of this question is the 
extent to which the rules are universally accepted by members of the system. 
Thus, it is possible to have simple rule changes in which all members of the 
system accept a new set of rules or complex rule changes in which only some 
members accept the new rules. For example, some authors have commented on the 
possibility of a separate set of rules for the international relations of communist 
nations in the contemporary system (Alker and Bock 1968, p. 124). It is 
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probably reasonable to assert that the "rules of the game" such as they existed, 
1870-1890, were almost universally accepted. The problem this raises for the 
Situational Analysis Project is that of determining when rule changes occur and 
for which actors they occur. It is hoped that, if they occur, the changes will 
be reflected in lower interscaler reliability scores and in counterintuitive 
results. If this is the case, then the Corkeley scale must and will be revised 
to reflect the new rules. We are optimistic, however, that only minor revisions 
will be necessary.
Future Research and Relevance to the Work of Other Investigators
To the present time, the quantitative study of international politics has 
tended to look at crises (North, Koch and Zinnes 1961; Holsti, Brody, North 1965; 
McClelland 1969a; Hermann and Hermann 1969) and wars (Richardson 1960a, 1960b; 
Singer and Small 1970; and Denton 1969). It has also surveyed the impact of 
alliance cooperation (Singer and Small 1968). Crises are not a frequent 
occurrence in international politics, despite their importance; nor do they 
represent typical behavior. Wars are rare even though they are more important. 
Finally, extreme evidences of cooperation like alliance, economic integration or 
confederation are equally rare and atypical on the other side of the scale. 
The advantage of event interaction approaches is that they capture the rest of 
the normal curve, the vast preponderance of international acts.
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Figure 7. "Normal" Curve of Conflict and Cooperation in International Politics
cooperationconflict neutral 
tone
The work of the Situational Analysis Project will in the future be devoted 
to die refinement of hypotheses and testing of propositions generated in a range 
of studies. Though we have emphasized the scaling of events on a conflict-cooperation 
continuum, the events can be categorized along lines of the WEIS project under 
McClelland and thus permit some comparisons between the international systems 
of the nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. Crisis propositions of McClelland, 
Hermann, Brody and North could be tested by a time series analysis of the 
"conflict spiral" in several of the nineteenth century crises. Crises stages
might even be approached through Guttmann scale techniques, prescribing necessary 
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escalatory and deescalatory steps in a sequence of conflictual or cooperative 
events. Many arguments of other investigators can be carried further. See for 
example Healy and Stein (1971) and Hart (1972). Singer snd Small hypothesize 
that alliances reduce interaction opportunities and thereby limit flexibility 
in the system, making for greater conflict. By seeking to elucidate the event flow 
between alliances and subsequent patterns of cooperation or conflict, one may 
observe the mechanism by which the Singer effect may operate (or not operate).
In more general terms, investigators have hypothesized that international 
conflict would be accentuated by either bipolarity or multipolarity; by the 
presence or absence of a balance of power; by certain thresholds in transaction 
indices; by certain types of military threats; by certain degrees of social and 
or geographic distance between states; by certain types of ideological or 
economic orientation; by the presence of internal conflict and so on. In several 
of these cases, new measures of independent variables will have to be provided. 
They may then be compared, however, to our dependent measures of cooperation 
and conflict. The central postulates of international relations theory, in 
short, may be tested against the data generated by the Situational Analysis 
Project. In the years that follow we hope to make a start on actually testing
these variables against diplomatic outcomes.
-42-
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